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THE SENATE AND HOUSE COUNSEL
OFFICES: DILEMMAS OF REPRESENTING
IN COURT THE INSTITUTIONAL
CONGRESSIONAL CLIENT
CHARLES TIEFER*
I
INTRODUCTION
The separation of powers disputes in recent decades involve frequent disa-
greements over the divergent constitutional interests of the two elected
branches of government, the President-led Executive, and the Legislative.1
Congress seeks to effectuate its constitutional powers and to check the Execu-
tive through legislative devices such as the Independent Counsel statute, the
arms sales and war powers laws, and legislative vetoes of statutory or nonstatu-
tory kinds.  Congress also conducts high-profile investigations of the Executive,
such as the Iran-Contra inquiry and successive Clinton Administration scandal
probes.  Presidents fight back by disputing the constitutionality of these legisla-
tive devices and by resisting congressional investigations.  Conversely, the Ex-
ecutive Branch investigates and prosecutes Members of Congress, taking a nar-
rower view of congressional privileges than Members do.
Many of the disputes take place out of court, in battles over the enactment
or vetoing of bills, in dueling opinions on constitutionality, and in invocations
and contestations of evidentiary privileges.  However, much of the struggle
does take place in court.  The sharp divergence in the Executive and congres-
sional interests in the struggle presents the Senate and the House of Represen-
tatives with the problem of how their institutional interests can be represented
in court.  In the past twenty years, both chambers have developed legal offices,
the Senate Legal Counsel and the General Counsel of the House of Represen-
tatives, to appear in the world of litigation and represent the interests of the ut-
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terly different world of Congress.  I had the privilege of serving in both offices,
as Assistant Senate Legal Counsel from 1979-84, and as Solicitor and Deputy
General Counsel of the House of Representatives from 1984-95.  Therefore, I
can provide some perspective about how a lawyer on the inside thinks about
the dilemmas of representation, particularly the different cultures of the Senate
and the House.
This essay looks at two particular clusters of issues regarding institutional
representation of Congress.  First, Congress uses its institutional counsel when
litigating with the President over the constitutionality of statutes.  For this, INS
v. Chadha,2 the Supreme Court case regarding the legislative veto, provides the
best example.  Second, Congress uses its institutional counsel in different types
of controversies, where the presence of distinct partisan or individual interests
make it more of an effort for counsel to discern the institutional interest, and
particularly difficult for counsel to avoid the perception that the interest being
served is the partisan or individual one.  For this type of controversy, the 1995
Senate vote to send the Senate Legal Counsel to enforce a Whitewater Com-
mittee subpoena for Presidential counsels’ notes (the “1995 Whitewater Com-
mittee Subpoena” dispute) provides a comparatively recent and dramatic ex-
ample to analyze.
Because the scholarly literature about the evolution and activity of the con-
gressional counsel office lacks the depth of the comparable literature for, say,
the Solicitor General’s office, I will begin with a discussion about the develop-
ment of the offices.  Then, when going on to Part III’s discussion of the Chadha
case and similar litigation, and Part IV’s consideration of the 1995 White House
Subpoena matter and the broad problem of finding institutional interests, I will
provide additional examples of the offices’ activity, and then attempt a conclu-
sion about the future.
II
RISE OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE COUNSELS
Congress statutorily created the Senate Legal Counsel office in the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978 (the “1978 Act”),3 in reaction to a need for represen-
tation felt in the post-Watergate era.  From the office’s inception in 19794 until
1995, it was headed by Michael Davidson.5  The office inherited a large dispute
with the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)—over the legislative veto issue and
                                                          
2. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
3. Relevant sections are codified at 2 U.S.C. § 288 (1994).
4. For an early description, see Lisa Shively, Senate Legal Counsel Defends Members, Aides,
ROLL CALL, Oct. 18, 1979.
5. Davidson’s nonpartisan style so satisfied the Senate’s requirements that he served 16 years
under Majority Leaders Robert Byrd (D-W. Va.), Howard Baker (R-Tenn.), Robert Dole (R-Kan.),
Byrd again, George Mitchell (D-Maine), and Dole again, consistently building the office’s reputation
for being above controversy.
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other smaller disputes over the constitutionality of a series of statutes—because
of Executive unwillingness to defend those statutes.6
A parallel office had evolved in the House.  Speaker Thomas P. O’Neill (D-
Mass.) had made Stanley M. Brand the House’s General Counsel in 1979, with
directions to begin representing the House’s institutional interest in litigation.7
In 1982, Brand’s office’s significance received general recognition when the
Administration filed the celebrated case of United States v. House of Represen-
tatives8 to resolve the Anne Gorsuch/Superfund executive privilege dispute.
Brand won the case, and then left to found his own firm,9 leaving Steven R.
Ross as his successor for the challenging next decade.
Increasingly, both counsel offices defended civil suits,10 and provided advice
and litigation support for congressional investigations on matters such as privi-
lege invocations11 and demands on the investigators for records or testimony.12
By the 1990s, the counsel offices faced the diverse additional legal fallout from
the newly intense focus upon congressional ethics, on matters ranging from the
                                                          
6. A helpful description of the office’s functions written by Michael Davidson is, Senate Legal
Counsel, in FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN M. FRUMIN, RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO.
101-28, at 1236-46 (1992).  M. Elizabeth Culbreth, Majority Leader Baker’s selection in 1981 to be
Deputy Legal Counsel, established a pattern of nonpartisan trust and effectiveness in the office, suc-
cessfully concluding the sensitive long-running case about congressional franking practices.  See Com-
mon Cause v. Bolger, 512 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1980), aff’d, 461 U.S. 911 (1983).
7. At the time, the title was formally Counsel to the Clerk of the House, but with Speaker
O’Neill’s backing, the position assumed its broader role, ultimately having its name changed to House
General Counsel to match that role.  The office at varying times has been administratively independ-
ent and a part of the Clerk’s system of House support offices, but either way the office has been inde-
pendent of supervision on legal decisions other than by general reporting to the Speaker and majority
and minority leaderships (similar to other House professional offices such as the Parliamentarian).
The rule defining the office’s function is currently Rule I.11 of the House of Representatives.  For an
account of the office’s initial period, see David Lauter, On the Inside: As Chief Lawyer for the House,
Stanley Brand Is Making His Mark, NAT’L L.J., May 16, 1983, at 1.
8. See 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983).
9. I then left the Senate office to join the House office.  For a profile of Ross’s role at that time,
see Martin Tolchin, Lawyer of the House: A Rising Star, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1986, at B6.  Also help-
ing establish the House office were Michael L. Murray, the Senior Associate Counsel who served from
1980 until 1996 as the expert on House operations, and long-term assistant counsels Janina A. Jaruzel-
ski, R. Michael Long, and Richard P. Stanton.
10. See Coalition to End the Permanent Congress v. Runyon, 979 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Mur-
ray v. Buchanan, 720 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc) (holding that the payment of salaries for
chaplains of both the Senate and the House of Representatives did not violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment); Susan B. Glasser, Former Challenger to Rep. Chris Smith Loses
Franking Case but May Go to Supreme Court, ROLL CALL, July 12, 1990 (regarding Rep. Chris Smith
(R-N.J.)).
11. See Harris v. Board of Governors, 938 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1991); In re Harrisburg Grand Jury,
638 F. Supp. 43 (M.D. Pa. 1986).  One Assistant Senate Legal Counsel went on to publish the treatise
on the general subject.  See JOHN C. GRABOW, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: LAW AND
PRACTICE (1988).
12. See Minpeco v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 844 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff’g Misc. 86-
0110 (D.D.C. July 9, 1986); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 527 F. Supp. 676 (D.D.C. 1981); United States v. Peo-
ples Temple of the Disciples of Christ, 515 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1981); cf. Paisley v. CIA, 724 F.2d 201
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Senate Legal Counsel appears in Freedom of Information Act case regarding Senate-
related documents); Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 714 F.2d 163 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (Senate Legal Counsel appears in case regarding Senate committee oversight).
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workings of the House Bank to the allegations against Senator Packwood.13
Particularly in the House, insurgent minority party members sometimes chal-
lenged the running of the institution by filing lawsuits.14
The 1994 election led, eventually, to Senate Majority Leader Dole (R-Kan.)
appointing a new Senate Legal Counsel, Thomas B. Griffith,15 and to Speaker
Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), after a transition period,16 appointing a new long-term
House General Counsel, Geraldine R. Gennet.17
III
DISPUTES WITH THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OVER THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
STATUTES
The INS v. Chadha18 case epitomizes the category of litigation in which the
institutional interest is most clear and distinct from partisan or individual inter-
ests, namely, litigation between institutional counsel for the Executive Branch
and for Congress over the constitutionality of statutes.  The issue in Chadha
was the legislative veto, which, in that case, consisted of a statute delegating
power to the Executive Branch to do something, subject to “veto” by a resolu-
tion adopted by one or both Houses of Congress.  The statute in Chadha gov-
                                                          
13. In an earlier era, epitomized by the Koreagate ethics issues and prosecutions of the late 1970s,
members’ ethics matters had often not required Congressional counsels to do much litigating.  The dif-
ferent ethics issues and patterns of the 1980s changed this.  For accounts from this period, see Susan B.
Glasser, From Cramped Digs, House Counsel Defends Congress in Cases Frivolous and Monumental,
ROLL CALL, Jan. 20, 1992; Terence Moran, Speaker’s Tool or Congress’ Champion: House Counsel
Feels the Heat, LEGAL TIMES, June 1, 1992, at 1; David F. Pike, His Job Blends Old with New: Senate
Counsel Handles One Client, 100 Bosses, L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 7, 1994, at 1; Charles Tiefer & Hyde
Murray, Congressional Elites Become Take-Charge Managers in New Era, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 18,
1989, at 38.
14. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
15. His replacement was read by some observers to signal a majority party leadership removal of
one of the buffers against partisanship in the office, though the signal lay only in that replacement, not
in the actual functioning of the office thereafter, which has continued to win respect.  See Harvey
Berkman, Senate Hires an Outsider as Counsel, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 27, 1995, at A14; Mary Jacoby, Out-
going Senate Legal Counsel Asked to Stay as Deputy Counsel After 16 Years in Top Job, ROLL CALL,
Mar. 16, 1995; Eamon Javers, Dole Picks New Senate Counsel to Replace Democrat, THE HILL, Mar.
15, 1995, at 8; Daniel Klaidman, Partisan Power Grab?; Senate Counsel Shakeup, LEGAL TIMES, Mar.
13, 1995, at 1.  An important element of continuity, notwithstanding the replacement of the Senate Le-
gal Counsel, was the choice by the Democratic leadership of Morgan Frankel, who had rendered dis-
tinguished service since 1981 as Deputy Legal Counsel.
16. Two House General Counsels served between 1994, when I ceased being Acting General
Counsel but continued as Solicitor, and 1996, when Geraldine R. Gennet started as Acting and then
full General Counsel.  See Daniel Klaidman, From Hill Outsider to House In-Houser, LEGAL TIMES,
Jan. 16, 1995, at 1.  The office’s regular work of responding to private lawsuits and subpoenas contin-
ued during the transition, particularly in two cases that I argued: Albanese v. Molinari, 884 F. Supp. 685
(E.D.N.Y. 1995), and Maddox v. Williams, 855 F. Supp. 406 (D.D.C. 1994), aff’d sub nom., Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
17. It reduced potential controversies about the office itself that the Speaker, in picking Gennet as
House General Counsel and Kerry Kircher as Deputy General Counsel, had appointed career federal
litigators without partisanship in their record.
18. 462 U.S. 919 (1983); see generally BARBARA H. CRAIG, CHADHA: THE STORY OF AN EPIC
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE (1988); Michael Davidson, Reflections from the Losing Side, REG.,
July/Aug. 1983, at 23.
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erned the deportation of aliens for lack of a legal right to remain in the United
States.19  The statute empowered the Attorney General to suspend such depor-
tations but also provided that either the House or the Senate could veto the
suspension of deportation by enacting a one-chamber “veto” resolution.20
Such legislative vetos had a long history.21  Particularly since the massive
delegations of authority by Congress to the President beginning with the New
Deal and World War II, Congress had sought to cabin the delegations through
legislative veto provisions.  Presidents had sought the delegations of power,
sometimes accepting and sometimes protesting the accompanying legislative
vetoes.  Ultimately, in the cases of the 1980s regarding an array of statutory de-
vices, the courts drew a formalist line invalidating some types of provisions, but
allowing other types to stand.
The decisive round of litigation began when opponents of the legislative
veto got one deportable alien, Jagdish Rai Chadha, to bring a test case.  The
Senate and House each had counsel present the case to the Supreme Court in
briefing and argument.  I drafted the Senate’s main brief.22
The case, and the other litigation over the legislative veto, support several
conclusions regarding the role of congressional counsel in this category of liti-
gation.  First, the legislative veto litigation illustrates how, in such relatively less
partisan matters, Members of Congress allow congressional counsel to repre-
sent the readily discernible institutional interest.23  On the presidential side,
Presidents from Franklin Roosevelt to Carter and Bush sought authority that
came only with some type of legislative veto arrangement.  The Presidents con-
sidered, but repeatedly overruled, the legally grounded protests against legisla-
tive veto arrangements expressed by their Attorneys General or, in Bush’s case,
White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray.  While the presidents had their way in
accepting legislative veto arrangements, DOJ had its own way in litigation,
starting with the Chadha case in the (Democratic) Carter Administration and
continuing in the (Republican) Reagan Administration.24  In other words, the
                                                          
19. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1994).
20. See Chada, 462 U.S. at 924.
21. For a discussion of the legislative veto, see LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL
DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 121-27 (1992); for a series of documents regarding disputes
arising during that history, see id. at 131-38.
22. Supplemental Brief on Reargument of the United States Senate, Appellee-Petitioner, INS v.
Chada, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (No. 80-1832).  The Court set the case for rebriefing and reargument.  I did
not draft the initial Senate brief, which focused on jurisdictional and other threshold defenses, but I did
draft the Senate brief on reargument, which presented an extensive history of the legislative veto.  Al-
though Congress lost, I had the satisfaction that Justice White’s dissenting opinion in the case re-
printed verbatim some very extensive parts from the brief.
23. See Stanley M. Brand, Battle Among the Branches: The Two Hundred Year War, 65 N.C. L.
REV. 901 (1987); Steven Ross, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the
Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 383 (1988).
24. The well-known examples of presidential acceptance of legislative vetos included President
Bush overruling Boyden Gray about the informal committee veto arrangement for funding of Nicara-
guan Contras, see FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 21, at 141-42, and President Carter making Attorney
General Griffin Bell write an opinion defending, as constitutional, the legislative veto for the Reor-
ganization Act authority that Carter prized, see id. at 136.  For treatments of the issues, see Christo-
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Executive Branch separated the process of making legislation and arrange-
ments with Congress, where it did not have a particular consistent institutional
position against legislative vetoes, from the process of litigation, where it did.
Similarly, in Congress, enacting or arranging legislative vetoes appealed to
conservative Republicans and appalled progressive Democrats, or vice-versa,
depending on the particular statutory context.25  Members of Congress wished
to make up their own minds, by whatever mix of policy, legal, and other factors,
about whether to enact or to establish otherwise various legislative veto ar-
rangements, and whether, after their establishment, to trigger them regarding
particular Executive actions.26  However, Members of Congress, as did Presi-
dents, seemed willing, once litigation began, to let the matter be handled by
their institutional litigation counsel.  Members simply accepted that if the Ex-
ecutive Branch let its lawyers, on an institutional basis, seek judicial decisions
invalidating a type of legislation, they should let their lawyers respond.  It was
appropriate for the issue to be left to institutional counsel to view in a long-
term, institutional way, for two reasons.  First, individual members recognized
that their interests were too lightly engaged on the issue compared to the col-
lective interest of the Senate and House.  Second, party mechanisms that ar-
ticulate collective interests in ways that divide the legislative institution also did
not engage on the issue.  DOJ’s litigative stance did not involve any partisan
component, as it first weighed-in during the Carter Administration, when the
same party controlled both branches, and continued unchanged into the Rea-
gan Administration, serenely ignoring the changes in party fortune in the 1980
election.  DOJ’s nonpartisanship induced legislative nonpartisanship.  The issue
consistently seemed institutional, not partisan.  Thus, our challenge as congres-
sional counsel was not in discerning or securing agreement about the overall in-
stitutional interest.  The same vague notions by which the Executive Branch let
DOJ “attack” the legislative veto, similarly caused the Legislative Branch to let
congressional counsel “defend” it.
                                                          
pher N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865 (1994); Arthur S. Miller & Jeffrey H. Bowman, Presidential Attacks on the
Constitutionality of Federal Statutes: A New Separation of Powers Problem, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 51 (1979);
Note, Executive Discretion and the Congressional Defense of Statutes, 92 YALE L.J. 970 (1983); Eva R.
Rubin, Congress v. the President in Court: Congressional Legal Offices, the Defense of the Constitu-
tionality of Statutes and the Separation of Powers (paper delivered at the Southwestern Social Science
Ass’n, Dallas, Texas, Mar. 18-21, 1987) (on file with author).
25. For example, conservative members approved legislative vetoes regarding regulatory rule-
making, while progressive members approved the legislative veto in the War Powers Resolution, 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1994).
26. For expert nonpartisan advice on such matters during the legislating process, members’ pri-
mary resource consists of the specialists in the Congressional Research Service’s American Law Divi-
sion, such as Mort Rosenberg, or in the Government Division, such as Louis Fisher, rather than the
litigators in the congressional counsels’ offices.  See, e.g., MORTON ROSENBERG, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERV., INVESTIGATIVE OVERSIGHT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY (1995); Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by
Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707 (1985); Muriel M. Spence, What Congress Knows and
Sometimes Doesn’t Know, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 653 (1996).
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Rather, our challenge was implementing a long-term view for the widely
varying legislative vetoes facing challenges in successive constitutional cases.
To be sure, for all the lawsuits, we had overall formalistic and functionalist
themes: formalistically, that each statute containing a legislative veto had re-
ceived bicameral approval and presentment (albeit that veto resolutions did
not), and functionally, that the legislative veto device existed to confine delega-
tions of authority.  However, implementing a long-term view involved much
more than merely repeating those overall arguments.  In each of the widely
varying statutory settings, from the immigration and regulatory laws to the ap-
propriation and procurement laws, the long-term view was to differentiate the
legislative veto statutes and to elucidate their origins and roles in checking
delegated authority in different statutory settings.27
Implicit in that strategy was our conclusion that Congress’s institutional in-
terest lay in achieving a judicial standard that dealt with each statute on a par-
ticularized basis.  We knew the judicial hostility to some legislative vetoes.28
We knew, from discussions and observations with members and staff, the great
importance of the diverse web of congressional review arrangements from con-
ditional nonstatutory “report-and-wait” arrangements to the War Powers
Resolution’s provision for bicameral resolutions ending U.S. military involve-
ment in hostilities.  Given that knowledge, and the freedom of action that Con-
gress gave its institutional counsel on this issue for the previously described
reasons, we defined the institutional interest as preserving as much of that web
of congressional arrangements as could survive a succession of cases.
With this long-term approach to defining and defending the legislative in-
terest, the Chadha decision, albeit a major defeat for us, by no means ended the
whole subject.  Following Chadha in 1983, Attorney General Edwin Meese’s
main Chadha-based thrust consisted of his assertive declaration that the Com-
petition in Contracting Act of 1984,29 with its legislative provision that stayed
procurements pending a form of legislative review, was unconstitutional and
should not be obeyed by the Executive Branch.30  Congress succeeded early in
forcing the withdrawal of Meese’s declaration of unconstitutionality, and suc-
ceeded ultimately in completely defending that provision, winning decisions
                                                          
27. See, e.g., City of Alexandria v. United States, 737 F.2d 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Consumer En-
ergy Council of Am. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982); American
Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982); National Wildlife Fed’n v. Clark,
577 F. Supp. 825 (D.D.C. 1984); Pacific Legal Found. v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982 (D. Mont. 1981).
28. We had more information about judicial hostility to legislative vetoes than did almost anyone
else in Congress, since we knew from oral arguments the thinking of many judges who did not write
opinions on the merits in our cases.  For example, I argued one legislative veto case before the D.C.
Circuit en banc prior to Chadha, with relentlessly hostile signals from the bench.  See Consumers Un-
ion of U.S., Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (per curiam) (holding that a require-
ment that the FTC submit its rules to Congress for review violated separation of power principles by
effectively giving Congress veto power).
29. See 31 U.S.C. § 3551 (1994).
30. See Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 610 F. Supp. 750 (D.N.J. 1985).
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upholding the statute in both circuit courts that heard cases.31  These victories
for the legislative interest followed from defining the litigation approach as dif-
ferentiating the diverse statutory contexts—specifically, for the 1984 Act cases,
the particular setting of the Act’s aim of curbing waste and abuse in defense
procurement, and the particular mechanism of a limited stay (not “veto”) of
procurement decisions.32  Thereafter, with Chadha’s limits established, variants
of the legislative veto device, particularly nonstatutory ones, flourished.33
The challenge of defending the congressional interest on issues of statutory
constitutionality went well beyond the core of head-on clashes like Chadha.34
DOJ claimed other powers in this context, such as refusing to defend a statute
when it deemed the arguments for the statute’s constitutionality unreasonable.35
In the 1980s, congressional counsel defended the Gramm-Rudman deficit con-
trol act,36 the Independent Counsel statute,37 a pocket-vetoed bill, and others.38
During the Clinton Administration, the Senate and House counsel offices have
presented defenses of the line item veto39 and of the qui tam provisions of the
                                                          
31. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988); Ameron, Inc. v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875 & 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986), aff’g 607 F. Supp. 962 & 610 F.
Supp. 750 (D.N.J. 1985).
32. There was a phase when Attorney General Edwin Meese claimed the power to issue govern-
ment-wide orders not to obey statutes, though congressional counsel, working with oversight commit-
tees and public opinion, successfully fought back against that assertion.  See Lear Siegler, 842 F.2d at
1102; Ameron, 787 F.2d at 875.  For background, see PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF,
SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 542-43 (1996).
33. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 21, at 128-30; for documentary examples, see id. at 138-42.
34. Numerous cases arose, such as the 1993 suit over First Lady Hillary Clinton chairing the
Health Care Task Force, in which DOJ’s broad views of Executive powers (in that case, by questioning
the constitutionality of the Federal Advisory Committee Act if applied) posed an issue warranting
congressional counsel participation.  See Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Clinton, 997
F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  Other examples included appropriation riders barring Executive nondisclo-
sure agreements, see American Foreign Serv. Ass’n v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153 (1989), and the power to
legislate regarding foreign affairs, see Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221
(1986).
35. Hence, Congressional counsel have defended statutes that DOJ declined—in the absence of
any particular Executive Branch prerogative at issue—regarding advertised alcohol content of beer,
see Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady, 944 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1991); newspaper broadcast cross ownership
rules, see News Am. Pub. Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1988); and restrictions on candidate en-
dorsements by public broadcasters, see League of Women Voters v. FCC, 489 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal.
1980), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984).  During the appeal of this case, DOJ changed its posi-
tion and took up the statute’s defense in the ensuing litigation, which ended in the Supreme Court.
36. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), aff’g Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374
(D.D.C. 1986).  For background, see FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 21, at 143-45.
37. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
North v. Walsh, 656 F. Supp. 414 (D.D.C. 1987).
38. For the pocket veto case, see Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987), vacating as moot, Barnes v.
Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985).  For other cases, see, for example, Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding sentencing guidelines as constitutional); In re Benny, 812 F.2d 1133 (9th
Cir. 1986) (holding that Congress could prospectively extend bankruptcy judges’ terms of office under
the 1984 Bankruptcy Act without violating the appointments clause); In re Koerner, 800 F.2d 1358 (5th
Cir. 1986) (same); compare Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (tax
statute challenged under the Origination Clause; Congressional counsel appear in defense of Congres-
sional defendants).
39. See Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997).
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False Claims Act,40 with every prospect for further statutory defense cases.41
Other disputes concern constitutional issues regarding various other congres-
sional processes from trial of judicial impeachments42 to Senate confirmation
authority infringed by presidential recess appointments.43  Each of these con-
troversies could have its own case study.44  The bottom line would generally be
that where the Executive Branch has an institutional opposition to Congress’s
powers without particular partisan overtones, the Congress therefore faces the
question of defending without particular partisan overtones.  With partisanship
muted, the challenge in these cases for congressional counsel tends less to be
discerning an institutional interest, than professionally defining that defense in
a way that protects the institution’s long-term as well as short-term interest.
                                                          
40. See United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
1140 (1994); United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Technologies Corp., 985 F.2d 1148
(2d Cir. 1993).  In neither line item veto nor qui tam cases did DOJ refuse to defend the statute, but it
is thought, on solid grounds, that the congressional counsels had much to add.
41. For examples of recent constitutional rider controversies, see American Foreign Serv. Ass’n v.
Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153 (1989); News Am. Pub. Co. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Clarke v.
United States, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  For a discussion, see CHARLES TIEFER, THE SEMI-
SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY FOR GOVERNING WITHOUT
CONGRESS 44-50 (1994); Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Rid-
ers, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456; Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the
Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833 (1994).
42. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993); Hastings v. United States Senate, 887
F.2d 332 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Hastings v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 490 (D.D.C. 1992), vacated, 988 F.2d
1280 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  For an unsuccessful challenge to Senate cloture rules, see Page v. Dole, No. 94-
5292, 1996 WL 310132 (D.D.C. May 13, 1996); Jim O’Connell, Former Congressional Candidate Sues
Senate over Constitutionality of Rules on Filibuster, ROLL CALL, Oct. 14, 1993.
43. See Mackie v. Clinton, 827 F. Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1993); Neal Devins, Tempest in an Envelope:
Reflections on the Bush White House’s Failed Takeover of the U.S. Postal Service, 41 UCLA L. REV.
1035 (1994).  Unlike other disputes over constitutional issues handled by the Senate Legal Counsel, for
this one Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) blocked the Senate Legal Counsel from filing a draft amicus
brief.  See Mary Jacoby, Hatch Move Prevents Democrats from Filing Brief on Lawsuit over Recess
Appointments, ROLL CALL, July 15, 1993; Bill McAllister, Recess Appointments: A Disputed Matter of
Timing, WASH. POST, July 19, 1993, at A13.  Majority Leader Mitchell just placed the draft brief in the
Congressional Record.  See 139 CONG. REC. S8544 (daily ed. July 1, 1993).
44. For example, immediately after enactment of the Flag Protection Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C. § 700
(1994), its official defense in its initial court tests had to come from Congressional counsel.  See United
States v. Eichman, 731 F. Supp. 1123 (D.D.C. 1990); United States v. Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. 415 (W.D.
Wash. 1990).  (At the later stages, rather than yield this important task to congressional counsel when
the cases went up to the Supreme Court, Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr took up, and devoted
himself constructively to, the task of providing the Act’s official defense.  See United States v. Eich-
man, 496 U.S. 310 (1990)).  At the start of those flag-burning cases, my challenge did not consist in dis-
cerning the congressional interest in upholding the statute, but rather in developing arguments sup-
plementing the record of hearings, reports, and floor speeches.
Some academic observers opine that the matter is one that proves why, once the Supreme Court
speaks, Congress’s role should be to just obey.  See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extra-
judicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997).  At the time, Congress, reading
the 5-4 Supreme Court decision on flag-burning, with its allusion to Justice Blackmun’s ambivalence,
and taking supporting testimony from Professors Tribe and Dellinger, considered it sound to seek a
statutory solution rather than rushing to President Bush’s proposal for a constitutional amendment.
For accounts of the flag matter, see Troy G. Pieper, Playing with Fire: The Proposed Flag Burning
Amendment and the Perennial Attack on Freedom of Speech, 11 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 843
(1996); Charles Tiefer, The Flag-Burning Controversy of 1989-90: Congress’ Valid Role in Constitu-
tional Dialogue, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 357 (1992).
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IV
REPRESENTING AN INSTITUTIONAL INTEREST IN CONTEXTS OF PARTISAN
AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS
Chadha and related cases concerned a context with relatively less partisan-
ship.  Quite different concerns, amounting to difficult dilemmas, arise for the
congressional counsel offices in contexts of strong partisan or individual inter-
ests.  The 1995 Whitewater Committee Subpoena matter provides a useful
starting point for discussing this problem.
When the 1978 Ethics in Government Act established the Senate Legal
Counsel’s office, it also established a civil enforcement mechanism for Senate
committee subpoenas.45  If a witness refused to obey the subpoena of a Senate
committee, and the committee reported the matter to the full Senate, the Sen-
ate could vote on whether to enforce the subpoena.46  This provision fits in with
a general pattern, in which both the Senate and House counsel offices advise
investigating committees.47  In the initial cases of Senate subpoena enforce-
ment, the Senate approved the enforcement action by unanimous consent.
Then, in the dramatic Packwood case, floor disputes occurred before the Sen-
ate authorized subpoena enforcement.48
In late 1995, the Senate Whitewater Committee invoked this statutory
mechanism to demand notes of a Whitewater meeting of the President’s private
and White House attorneys.49  The White House invoked attorney-client privi-
lege.  Legal contests regarding privilege between the White House and the
Senate rarely go as far as this one did.  The Senate Whitewater Committee split
sharply on party lines, the Senate voted along party lines regarding whether to
                                                          
45. See 2 U.S.C. § 288b (1994).
46. By tradition, the committee’s report of the matter to the Senate floor reflects close coordina-
tion with the Senate Legal Counsel regarding structuring of the anticipated court case.  A Senate vote
in favor of enforcement would direct the Senate Legal Counsel to file a subpoena-enforcement action
in federal district court; the witness would have to obey a judicial order enforcing the subpoena on pain
of contempt of court.  For some examples, see Matter of the Application of the United States Senate
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigation, 655 F.2d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Senate Select Comm. v. Secord,
664 F. Supp. 562 (D.D.C. 1987).
47. For example, in the late 1980s, both counsels dealt with the major legal demands of the Iran-
Contra investigations.  Among other aspects, the House office detailed me to serve as Special Deputy
Chief Counsel of the House Iran-Contra Committee.  See generally George W. Van Cleve & Charles
Tiefer, Navigating the Shoals of “Use” Immunity and Secret International Enterprises in Major Con-
gressional Investigations: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 55 MO. L. REV. 43 (1990).
48. The Senate Ethics Committee evaluating the allegations against the Senator needed to enforce
its subpoena for his diary.  A number of Senators opposed the enforcement action for the subpoena, so
only after floor debate and a divided roll-call vote did the Senate authorize the Senate Legal Counsel
to pursue the ultimately successful subpoena enforcement action.  See Senate Select Comm. on Ethics
v. Packwood, 845 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C.), emergency motion for stay pending appeal denied, No. 94-5023
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 1994), application for stay denied, 510 U.S. 1319 (1994).
49. For accounts of this matter, see LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 166-67 (4th ed. 1997); Mark Miller, A Privileged Character? The
President and Joint Defense, 85 GEO. L.J. 1979 (1997); Charles Tiefer, Privilege Pushover: Law and
Practical Realities Fatally Weakened the President’s Ability to Assert an Attorney-Client Privilege in the
Senate Whitewater Committee, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 1, 1996, at 24.
TIEFER.FMT.DOC 12/10/98  9:35 AM
Page 47: Spring 1998] SENATE & HOUSE COUNSEL 57
authorize enforcement,50 and the White House surrendered the notes on the
eve of suit.
This matter reflects the type of work about which the majority and minority
parties dispute what the congressional counsels should do.  The dispute raises a
question about whether there is an institutional interest at all.51  The answer to
that question is twofold.  First, Congress’s procedures allow many nuances in
just how partisan a decision is.  The Senate minority opposed the 1995 White-
water notes enforcement vote, but it did not filibuster, and it gave no audible
objection to the legitimacy of the outcome, both steps that would likely occur if
the majority party sought Senate enforcement of an unfair subpoena to, say,
the National Organization of Women.  Second, as described in the previous
discussion of Chadha, the Members’ vote during enactment of a measure and
the role of the Senate Legal Counsel after enactment can differ.  Under some
circumstances, even after a party-line vote adopts something, defending or, for
subpoena enforcement resolutions, implementing that vote can occur in a way
detached from the partisan decision to adopt.
For something like the Whitewater Subpoena matter, the Senate Legal
Counsel would succeed in following-up a partisan vote and by carefully sorting
out and discarding the partisan arguments made for enforcing the subpoena
and by adopting and developing the institutional arguments in litigation.52  The
partisan arguments to be discarded are the accusations against the President
and his staff about which partisan supporters and opponents sharply disagree;
that they do not deserve attorney-client privilege because they assertedly dis-
cussed committing violations of law.  The institutional arguments to be devel-
oped are, for example, why even guiltless Executive officials would not be able
in this particular context to deny the notes of their discussions to an authorized
congressional investigation.  The Senate’s institutional position would be the
privilege’s inapplicability in this context:  The President had chosen not to in-
                                                          
50. 141 CONG. REC. S18993 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
51. That 1995 vote reflected a basic political judgment—the majority party demonstrating opposi-
tion to and the minority party demonstrating support of—the White House in that situation.  Skeptics
may well argue that, at such points, no “institutional” interest exists at all, only the interest of each
party.  The outcome consists of one party or the other obtaining the use of the institution’s authority
not some epiphany of a pre-existing institutional interest.  Of course, there are parallels to whether, in
other action contexts, there is a “public interest” or a “legislative intent,” as opposed to clashing par-
ticular interests that win the government or legislative action they seek.  I have recently discussed
some of the applications of positive political theory and public choice theory to this context.  See
Charles Tiefer, Congressional Oversight of the Clinton Administration and Congressional Procedure, 50
ADMIN. L. REV. 199 (1998); Charles Tiefer, “Budgetized” Health Entitlements and the Fiscal Constitu-
tion in Congress’s 1995-1996 Budget Battle, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 411, 420-25 (1996).
52. In the majority and minority portions of the Whitewater notes committee report, the legally
sophisticated treatment of the opposing arguments about privilege in the matter anticipates the issues
in court.  See THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE WHITEWATER DEVELOPMENT COR-
PORATION AND RELATED MATTERS, REFUSAL OF WILLIAM H. KENNEDY, III, TO PRODUCE NOTES
SUBPOENAED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE WHITEWATER DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION AND RELATED MATTERS, S. REP. NO. 104-191 (1995).  As Assistant Senate Legal
Counsel, I helped draft the committee reports for two such enforcement actions.  The charter for the
Senate Legal Counsel’s office specifies the particular contents for such a report.  See 2 U.S.C. § 288d(c)
(1994).
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voke executive privilege formally and the attorney-client privilege arguably
could not be raised, at a sufficiently strong level to block a Senate subpoena,
absent such a formal Presidential invocation.53
Other examples of partisan disputes over the congressional counsels’ as-
signments further illustrate what the 1995 Senate example suggests.  From time
to time in the House, minority members challenge the running of the chamber
in the form either of lawsuits54 or of raising questions about the House General
Counsel’s positions regarding outside lawsuits55 or DOJ subpoenas.56  Since the
1995 transition in party control, the General Counsel has been involved in rep-
resentation in the course of various minority party challenges.  The minority
party challenged the new House rule requiring a three-fifths supermajority vote
for tax increases.  In response, the House General Counsel defended the rule,
winning in court.  In 1997, the minority party Member who had won a disputed
                                                          
53. For example, the majority party, if it were presenting a naked partisan preference, might argue
the inapplicability of the attorney-client privilege for meetings at which the participating President’s
lawyers plan a crime; in contrast, the Senate Legal Counsel would be expected to take a more institu-
tional position, arguing the unavailability of an attorney-client privilege when the President does not
invoke executive privilege, deeming Presidential invocation a prerequisite of any assertion of a Presi-
dential privilege.  For background on such evidentiary disputes, see Stanley M. Brand & Sean Con-
nelly, Constitutional Confrontation: Preserving a Prompt and Orderly Means by Which Congress May
Enforce Investigative Demands Against Executive Branch Officials, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 71 (1986);
Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal—Do Nothing,
48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109 (1996).
54. These included various challenges to congressional pay increases, see Boehner v. Anderson, 30
F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir.), aff’g 665 F. Supp. 23 (D.D.C.
1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 966 (1988), voting by House territorial delegates, see Michel v. Anderson,
14 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994), aff’g 817 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1993), an election dispute, see McIntyre v.
O’Neill, 603 F. Supp. 1053 (D.D.C. 1985), the Congressional Record’s practices regarding revising and
editing, see Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985), and committee ratios, see Vander Jagt v.
O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
55. This period is described in Rebecca M. Salokar, Legal Counsel for Congress: Protecting Insti-
tutional Interests, 20 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 131, 149-50 (1993).  One example concerned term
limits litigation.  See Susan B. Glasser, Cox Fails in Move Against Counsel’s Term-Limit Brief, ROLL
CALL, Nov. 7, 1991.  Regarding the related litigation, see Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General—
Limited Political Terms in Certain Elective Offices, 592 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1991); Susan B. Glasser, Fla.
Court Rejects Brief of House Counsel, OKs Term-Limit Initiative for Nov. 3 Ballot, ROLL CALL, Jan. 6,
1992.  Regarding other term limits litigation, see 139 CONG. REC. S1146 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993)
(Senate Legal Counsel authorization); Susan B. Glasser, Mitchell Outlines the Senate Objections to
States Restricting Terms of Members: Senate Legal Counsel Authorized to Represent Pryor, Bumpers in
Term-Limit Lawsuit, ROLL CALL, Feb. 8, 1993; Susan B. Glasser, Foley to Sue to Try to Kill Term
Limits, ROLL CALL, May 27, 1993.  The issue was resolved in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514
U.S. 779 (1995) (holding that states may not impose qualifications for congressional office in addition
to the requirements set forth in the Constitution).
56. In 1992, the House voted as a body to turn over the records of every House Member’s checks
at the House Bank, precluding the House General Counsel from taking a position in court that the
subpoena was overbroad on basic separation of powers grounds.  The records went to an election-year
inquiry staged for maximum political advantage by the Bush Administration, forgoing the opportunity
to ask the courts to narrow the subpoena to records with relevance to the inquiry.  See Timothy J. Bur-
ger & Susan B. Glasser, Solemn Hour for the House: Precedent, Privacy Rights Focus of Vote on
Wilkey’s Subpoena, ROLL CALL, Apr. 30, 1992; Timothy J. Burger, Wilkey Ends Bank Probe, Tags No
More Than Four Members for Criminal Scrutiny, ROLL CALL, Dec. 17, 1992.  Similarly, during this pe-
riod the House did not take any amicus role on the political question challenge by Representative Dan
Rostenkowski (D-Ill.) to his indictment, even though the D.C. Circuit’s favorable ruling on that chal-
lenge, see United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1995), showed its significance.
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House election found herself the target, during the ensuing election contest, of
a subpoena statute wielded by the majority party.  She challenged the statute,
the House General Counsel defended it, and the court upheld the statute.57
Besides these types of cases, another complex dilemma for congressional
counsel arises in the context of strong individual interests, namely, the cases of
individual members in trouble or who have evidence about others. 58  For exam-
ple, the counsel offices may provide representation regarding the Speech or
Debate Clause,59 the bedrock constitutional protection of the Senate and House
against outside legal interference in cases of members prosecuted,60 civilly
sued,61 or subjected to evidentiary demands.62
This dilemma elicits a variety of responses.  For example, because the tradi-
tional Senate and House counsels’ approaches to criminal matters diverge
somewhat, the House General Counsel’s office has more readily stepped for-
ward to represent institutional interests in criminal investigations or cases in a
                                                          
57. The case concerning the three-fifths supermajority requirement was Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d
831 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (filed by Rep. David Skaggs (D-Colo.)), aff’g 898 F. Supp. 1 (1995).  The case
concerning the contested election subpoena statute was Dornan v. Sanchez, 978 F. Supp. 1315 (C.D.
Cal. 1997) (filed by Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-Cal.)).  See Rachel Van Dongen, Dornan Subpoenas
Face Constitutional Test, ROLL CALL, Sept. 1, 1997.
58. See Congressional “Law Firms” Help Out Members in Court, 43 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 55
(1986), and cases cited in preceding footnotes.  The congressional backing of invocations of Speech or
Debate privilege particularly include Members seeking to invoke privilege regarding the broad sur-
rounding circumstances of Ethics Committee proceedings.  Congress has a strong institutional interest
in protecting the Members involved in the intense political controversies surrounding those proceed-
ings from distracting and intrusive judicial processes.  Members who seek advice from, or give testi-
mony to, the Ethics Committee would otherwise face later outside subpoenas and questioning.  See
United States v. McDade, No. 96-1508 (3d Cir. July 12, 1996) (unpublished order), vacating Cr. No. 92-
249 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 1996); United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Han-
sen, 772 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
59. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
60. The statutory charter for the Senate Legal Counsel’s office limits its representation of mem-
bers, officers, and staff as parties to civil cases.  See 2 U.S.C. § 288c (1994).  Either congressional coun-
sel office may appear in criminal matters by representing document custodians and staff witnesses, or
by representing the institution or its leadership as amici.  See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979);
United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979), on remand, 635 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1980); United States
v. Swindall, 971 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988); United
States v. McDade, 28 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1994), aff’g 827 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 514
U.S. 1003 (1995).
61. These include suits for defamation, see Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Williams
v. Brooks, 996 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1993); Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1987), employ-
ment termination (where they still retain a function although both the Senate and House have now es-
tablished specific offices, separate from the Senate and House counsels’ offices, to handle employment
discrimination proceedings), see Juliet Eilperin, Appeals Court Rejects Capitol Police Challenge to
Mandatory Retirement, ROLL CALL, Aug. 3, 1995, at 12, and other torts, see Brownsville Golden Age
Nursing Home, Inc. v. Wells, 839 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1988); Karchin v. Metzenbaum, 587 F. Supp. 563
(N.D. Ohio 1983).
62. See Mary Jacoby, Hill Press Releases Protected Speech, ROLL CALL, Sept. 7, 1995, at 17; In re
City of El Paso, Texas, 887 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Pittston Coal Group, Inc. v. United Mine
Workers of America, 894 F. Supp. 275, 279 n.5 (W.D. Va. 1995); United Transp. Union v. Springfield
Terminal Ry. Co., 132 F.R.D. 4 (D. Maine 1990); Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Un-
ion, Misc. No. 89-0073, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5478 (D.D.C. May 18, 1989); Shape of Things to Come,
Inc. v. County of Kane, 588 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Bardoff v. United States, 628 A.2d 86 (D.C.
1993).
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way that buffered members and staff against prosecutors,63 as in the lengthy
proceedings for Representative McDade.64  The Senate Legal Counsel has been
less forward about providing members and staff with such buffering.65  My six-
teen-year service in the two offices and my countless discussions with other
counsel in both offices have led me to develop only a theory, not a confident
understanding, of the difference.66  I think of it in terms of a difference between
the cultures of the two chambers.  The House culture defers less to prosecutors,
seeing their power frequently and potently employed, knowing there is no nec-
essary correlation between the House’s own internal judgments upon members
and the diverse calculations of the ninety-plus politically appointed U.S. Attor-
neys around the country, and hence sometimes distrusting prosecutors’ motiva-
tions and judgments.67  Therefore, the House culture has approved, at least at
times, General Counsels who scrap with prosecutors on members’ behalf.
Senators have a reduced sense of vulnerability to, and distrust of, prosecutors.68
Hence, the Senate culture approves a Senate Legal Counsel who remains aloof
from the controversies surrounding the occasional prosecutorial activity.  Both
cultures, on the other hand, are equally sensitized to, and fed up with, the mas-
                                                          
63. Besides previously cited cases, others had issues covering the gamut from the official nature of
Members’ telephone calls, see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1978); United States
v. Eilberg, 553 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1981); United States v. Eilberg, 507 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Pa. 1980), to
undue subjection of Members to retrials and their freedom from gag orders inhibiting communication
with constituents, see United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987); Susan B. Glasser, Hill Lead-
ership Intervenes in Rep. Ford’s Fraud Case, ROLL CALL, May 2, 1991.
64. Recently, the House General Counsel completed many effective years of presenting the
House’s institutional interest during the investigation, pre-trial proceedings, and trial ending with ac-
quittal in 1995, for Representative McDade (R-Pa.).  See United States v. McDade, No. 96-1508 (3d
Cir. July 12, 1996) (unpublished order), vacating No. 92-249 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 1996); United States v.
McDade, 85 F.3d 613 (3d Cir. 1996) (table); United States v. McDade, 28 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1994).  For
an account, see Matthew R. Walker, Comment, Constitutional Law—Narrowing the Scope of Speech or
Debate Clause Immunity—United States v. McDade, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 377 (1995).  Similarly, without
raising any partisan dispute, the House General Counsel’s office represented Speaker Gingrich in the
wrongful discharge and defamation case filed by former House Historian Christina Jeffrey.  See Amy
Keller & Juliet Eilperin, Fired House Historian Files $16 Million Lawsuit Against Speaker, His Aide,
and Three Democrats, ROLL CALL, May 16, 1996.
65. This is a matter of proportion, not complete Senate avoidance of criminal cases.  During the
grand jury investigation of Senator David Durenberger (R-Minn.), questions arose as to whether DOJ
had infringed the Senator’s Speech or Debate protections.  Upon indictment, the Senate Legal Counsel
did appear and file an amicus brief in support of Senator Durenberger.  See United States v. Duren-
berger, Crim. No. 3-93-65, 1993 WL 738477 (D. Minn. Dec. 3, 1993).  For the case following the subse-
quent reindictment, see United States v. Durenberger, 48 F.3d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
66. It traces back to basic philosophical contrasts between the first House Counsel, Stanley Brand,
and the first Senate Counsel, Michael Davidson, and yet the contrast has outlasted them both.
67. To show the very diverse manifestations of House suspicions of federal prosecutors, during the
Reagan (and successor) Administrations, there were observations that Attorneys General had ap-
proved disproportionate numbers of black Democratic representatives for criminal investigation and
prosecution.  During the Bush Administration, there were observations that the Attorney General set
up a House Bank inquiry calculated maximally to injure Representatives in the 1992 election.  During
the Clinton Administration, Chairman Dan Burton (R-Ind.) expressed suspicions about the handling
of his investigation for extortion, at a time when his committee was holding hearings about the Attor-
ney General’s handling of the 1996 campaign finance matter.
68. Senators are fewer in number, higher in status, having greater average age and experience,
more likely to be of the same race as prosecutors, and somewhat more able to survive politically a
prosecutorial inquiry due to their six-year terms and larger constituent bases.
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sive current tides of civil litigation and discovery, and so both cultures expect,
and receive, counsel offices that aggressively respond to civil suits and subpoe-
nas.
Whether the matter involves partisan interests, such as the 1995 Whitewater
Subpoena, or individual interests, such as the cases of members in civil or
criminal trouble, congressional counsel face the initial problem of finding an in-
stitutional interest to represent.  Congressional counsel must find an interest
that is distinct from some partisan or individual interest appropriation repre-
sented by majority and minority counsel on committees or in personal offices.
They must serve the chamber’s long-term, non partisan interest, not just seek to
keep majority members in office or just promote the majority’s political
agenda.  Even more, congressional counsel face the problem of perceptions and
appearances, namely, that regardless of how well they do at finding and hewing
to an institutional interest, critics will identify them with the partisan or indi-
vidual interests also present in the case.69
As the 1995 Whitewater Subpoena matter suggests, part of the answer in
finding the institutional interests consists in recognizing that congressional
counsel offices do not participate in planning or deciding the activities that are
typically the basis of outside lawsuits, subpoenas, or investigations.  As long as
the member’s activity occurs in her official capacity, she shares with all her
colleagues the collective and, hence, institutional interest that official activities
should receive the necessary support from official resources, including the re-
sources for legal representation.  Whatever the institution’s reasons for allow-
ing members to conduct their official and representational activities, from leg-
islating and Washington casework to press releases and opening offices in the
state or district, the institution has the same interest in providing legal repre-
sentation that it has in providing office supplies, computer support, staff fund-
ing, and so forth.  When the individual interest becomes very strong and the
bounds of representation by government counsel loom near, as in criminal mat-
ters, then the primary representation function belongs to private counsel, with
congressional counsel representing a separate institutional amicus.
As for the perception problem, the congressional counsel offices avoid
many potential concerns by employing general policies about categories of
cases in which they will and will not provide representation.  As previously de-
scribed, the offices represent members in the defense of civil suits and eviden-
tiary demands arising out of their official position, without regard to the party
of the member or the attractiveness of the particular representation.70  On the
                                                          
69. What makes the dilemma of congressional counsel so acute in regard to perceptions is the in-
tensity in the Legislative Branch of press coverage, and debate, about partisan and ethical suspicions.
Arguably there is no institution in society that can match the United States Congress in its dedication
to the critical, perhaps even hypercritically suspicious, political analysis of everything said or done
therein, including legal representation.  That has always been part of the job of politics, and today’s
Washington climate, discussed later in the conclusion, accentuates it.
70. See 2 U.S.C. § 288c(a)(1) (1994) (Senate Legal Counsel); Rule I.11 of the House of Represen-
tatives (“Legal assistance and representation shall be provided without regard to political affiliation.”).
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other hand, congressional counsel take no part in individual members’ quests
for information71 or in certain kinds of individual members’ submissions as ami-
cus curiae.72  Such categorical rules depoliticize a large portion of the represen-
tational decisions, avoiding both the reality, and the perception, of conflict in
many cases.  Journalistic and member comment, and debate in the chamber,
routinely follow whenever the counsel offices make a representational decision
open to dispute.
V
CONCLUSION
As each office approaches its twentieth anniversary next year, they seem to
be a major success.  There is no sign that either chamber thinks it could receive
adequate representation from hired private counsel or from DOJ, as they did
before 1979.73  Moreover, the courts and DOJ accept congressional counsel as
necessary presenters of a special federal government position.  Today it is diffi-
cult to imagine how the Senate and House could determine their institutional
interests, and present these to the legal world, without these legal offices.
Just as change in the legal environment of Congress produced the Senate
and House Counsel offices, so, too, change in the Congress itself may intensify
the dilemmas faced by those offices in finding the institutional interests they
represent and avoiding the perception of identification with purely partisan or
individual interests.  Not only is the special climate of the formative period long
past,74 but the Congress of twenty years ago had several institutional-stability
sources, now lacking, that mitigated internal conflicts and thereby made institu-
tional interests more readily determinable.  Political parties of that time had
more overlap and more in common owing to “swing-vote” characteristics of
conservative Southern Democrats and moderate Republicans.  Member and
staff turnover was lower.  There was more institutional loyalty, comity, and ci-
vility to balance the centrifugal forces of hardened partisanship, electronic me-
dia coverage, and massive independent campaign financing.  Rapid flips in
party control for the presidency and both Houses make it harder for those at
                                                          
71. See Southern Christian Leadership Conf. v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff’g Lee v.
Kelley, 99 F.R.D. 340 (D.D.C. 1983).
72. The subject of Members’ amicus briefs has recently been discussed in Eric Heberlig & Rorie
L. Spill, Cuing the Courts: Members of Congress as Friends of the Court (Paper for the 1997 Am. Poli.
Sci. Ass’n, Aug. 29-31, 1997) (on file with author).
73. Nor has there been any movement in the past two decades toward a unified office of Congres-
sional Legal Counsel.  It came to appear, particularly during the years 1981-86 of different party con-
trol of the two chambers, that the Counsels have their hands filled responding to the complex signals
from their separate legislative institutions without the further challenge of reconciling all the cham-
bers’ differences.
74. In the formative period of 1977-80, congressional Democrats and Republicans had different,
but harmonizing, reasons for thinking that an in-house counsel’s office could represent the chamber’s
institutional interest much better than the traditional litigators for the whole government in DOJ:
Congressional Democrats had been traumatized by Watergate, and congressional Republicans had no
great trust in the Justice Department of the (Democratic) Carter Administration.
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the political level in either branch of government to place credence in their
branch’s having a transcendant, stable, institutional interest.
The changed environment means more intense problems for institutional
congressional counsel identifying, and gaining general agreement on, a tran-
scendant institutional interest, but, at the same time, creates a certain urgency
for them to do so.  The sheer burden of legal defense costs in Washington’s cur-
rent legal climate of massive investigation, scrutiny, and civil suit discovery
proceedings creates a common interest in Congress for counsel offices that lift
that burden off of everyone, so long as the line drawn regarding when represen-
tation will be provided, and when not, is perceived as following consistent stan-
dards.  In an era of member and staff turnover, and of flips in party control,
Senate and House offices that can succeed in providing both the image, and the
reality, of nonpartisanship and institutional memory become even more neces-
sary.  Therefore, the Senate and House will likely continue to impose upon
their counsel offices the dilemma of choosing, in the midst of contention and
disputation, something that approximates an institutional interest to represent.
